How Time Affects EU Decision-Making by Golub, Jonathan & Steunenberg, Bernard
www.ssoar.info
How Time Affects EU Decision-Making
Golub, Jonathan; Steunenberg, Bernard
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Golub, J., & Steunenberg, B. (2007). How Time Affects EU Decision-Making. European Union Politics, 8(4), 555-566.
https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116507082814
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-229284
Forum Section
How Time Affects EU
Decision-Making
Jonathan Golub
University of Reading, UK
Bernard Steunenberg
University of Leiden, The Netherlands
5 5 5
European Union Politics
DOI: 10.1177/1465116507082814
Volume 8 (4): 555–566
Copyright© 2007
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi 
and Singapore
In a recent article in this journal, Golub demonstrated that, in order to under-
stand the determinants of legislative decision-making speed in the European
Union and their theoretical implications, it is essential for analysts to fit
survival models that do not make assumptions about the shape of the
baseline hazard rate and that account for variables whose value and effect
may change over time (Golub, 2007). To improve upon earlier findings that
ignored these issues, he fit a Cox model with time-interaction terms that
allow non-proportional effects to data on the 1669 proposed directives made
between 1968 and 1998. The inclusion of these time-interaction terms was
based on the well-known tests of proportionality (Box-Steffensmeier and
Zorn, 2001). Although correct, the interpretation of the results of such a
model is less straightforward than he recognized. In this paper we explain
how to make sense of the estimates from survival models that contain time-
interaction terms, and then investigate how a more precise interpretation
affects Golub’s findings. Overall, we draw three main conclusions: the effect
that formal qualified majority voting (QMV) rules have on speeding up
decision-making is even larger and more consistent than originally claimed;
the trade-off between efficiency and legitimacy is more complicated than first
thought; and the effects of some key variables do not just wear off but
actually reverse direction once proposals survive long periods of time.
Survival models with time-interaction terms
The assumption that the effect of covariates remains constant over time is
often unjustified, and violations of the assumption can render a model’s
estimates and inferences meaningless. Violations can arise naturally in all
covariates when their relationship with the hazard is affected by time, but by
definition they arise when we have time-varying covariates (TVCs), that is,
covariates where the initial coding assigned to a case changes during its
lifetime (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2003; Golub, 2007). The solution is to
fit a model with time-interactive terms that accommodate these non-
proportional effects (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn, 2001; Box-Steffensmeier
and Jones, 2004), as Golub (2007) did in his paper on decision-making speed.
However, the interpretation of such a model is not straightforward, since the
impact of a variable on the hazard rate is now a combination of its time-
independent and time-dependent coefficients. This can be shown as follows.
Imagine that we fit a Cox model that included one TVC and that its effect
changed over time. The hazard rate would then be
(1)
with x(t)1 as the TVC. Note that, to deal with a non-proportional effect of this
covariate, time can be transformed in a way that fits better to the underlying
structure in the data (in this instance, by taking the natural logarithm, as is
done in Golub’s study). We would then use the parameter estimates from this
equation to calculate the effect of a unit change in x1 on the hazard ratio for a
case that did not undergo state changes. To get the effect of a unit change in
a covariate we construct a hazard ratio where the denominator is the baseline
hazard rate (i.e. hypothetical case j with all covariates set to zero). So we have
(2)
where bˆ1 is a time-independent coefficient and bˆ2 ln(t) is a time-dependent
coefficient. The numerator at the right-hand side of this equation can be
rewritten as:
(3)
In other words, the impact of x1 on the hazard rate is now the result of bˆ1 and
bˆ2 ln(t). The combined term [bˆ1 + bˆ2 ln(t)] is the actual coefficient of the co-
variate, which depends not only on the values of bˆ1 and bˆ2 but also on t.
Golub recognized this much, and he calculated the magnitude of the
effects of certain variables at different values of t, the point after which the
effects of each variable ‘wore off’, and the point at which the effects of one
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variable outweighed those of another. He did this by examining the exact
value of the combined term and the point at which it equaled exactly zero.
But this approach ignores the standard error of the combined term, and herein
lies the problem (Steunenberg and Kaeding, 2007). This is a common mistake
of those who try to interpret interactive terms and it yields misleading
inferences.
The standard error of the new, combined coefficient is actually a function
of the standard errors of the original coefficients, the covariance between both
terms, and time. We know from the more familiar setting of interactive terms
in linear regression, logit and probit models (Friedrich, 1982; Brambor et al.,
2006) that the standard error of the sum (bˆ1 + bˆ2x) is calculated as follows:
. (4)
In the context of a non-proportional hazards model, our ‘x’ is some function
of t, in our case ln(t). So the standard error of the sum (b1 + b2 ln(t)) is
. (5)
The value of this term, as indicated by t, also depends on time. Consequently,
the size, sign and significance of the combined coefficient may vary with time.
The crucial point is that the effect of a covariate is zero not when the value
of the combined term [bˆ1 + bˆ2 ln(t)] is exactly 0, but when it is indistinguish-
able from 0, and not when the hazard ratio in equation (2) is exactly 1, but
when it is indistinguishable from 1.
There are two equivalent ways in which the standard error of the
combined term allows us to determine the values of t for which these situ-
ations obtain, and thus to draw more precise inferences about the effects of
covariates. First, we can compute the Wald statistic, which is defined as
follows:
(6)
for all values of t. This statistic follows a chi-square distribution with one
degree of freedom and thus provides a formal test of whether the combined
term is distinguishable from 0. Alternatively, for all values of t we can
construct a confidence interval around the point prediction for the hazard
ratio in equation (2). This hazard ratio is indistinguishable from 1 whenever
the confidence interval contains the value 1.1 Moreover, we can estimate the
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hazard ratio and construct confidence intervals for any linear combination of
covariates, which allows us to compare the effects of one covariate with
another at any point in time. Their respective effects are indistinguishable
whenever their respective confidence intervals overlap.
Time interaction and EU decision-making
Having shown how the combined coefficients and standard errors of co-
variates in non-proportional hazards models vary with time, in this section
we re-analyze Golub’s data and provide a more careful interpretation of his
results. Table 1 reports the original estimates from Golub’s Cox model with
TVCs and non-proportional effects for six covariates.
We begin by assessing the impact of these six covariates at different
values of survival time for legislative proposals. Table 2 presents the results.
European Union Politics 8(4)5 5 8
Table 1 Estimates for Golub’s Cox model of EU decision-making speed
Variable b s.e.
QMV 3.122**** 0.478
QMV after SEA 2.110**** 0.513
QMV after Maastricht 0.413** 0.166
Cooperation procedure –6.041**** 0.614
Codecision procedure –5.001**** 0.876
EU9 0.496** 0.198
EU10 0.457* 0.243
EU12 0.659** 0.257
EU15 0.571** 0.263
Thatcher (as prime minister) –1.716**** 0.379
Expanded legislative agenda 0.177 0.191
Legislative backlog 0.026**** 0.007
QMV  ln(t) –0.428**** 0.079
QMV after SEA  ln(t) –0.224*** 0.085
Cooperation  ln(t) 0.890**** 0.099
Codecision  ln(t) 0.725**** 0.134
Thatcher  ln(t) 0.282**** 0.061
Legislative backlog  ln(t) –0.004*** 0.0009
Likelihood ratio 311.27***
Number of cases 1669
Notes: See Golub (2007) for a further explanation of the variables. Data are right-censored on 
17 December 1999.
* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; **** p < .001
We chose values located up to nearly one standard deviation below and one-
and-a-half standard deviations above the mean survival time of 1100 days,
because decision-making time is highly positively skewed, with a median of
646 days. This range, from 80 to 2900, covers 87% of the observations in
Golub’s data set. For each covariate we also present the combined coefficient,
its standard error and the significance level based on the Wald statistic.
The table shows how the impact of our covariates changes over time.
While some covariates may have a positive impact on the hazard rate at some
moment in time, leading to the speeding-up of decision-making, this impact
may change into a negative one later on. In addition, the combined coefficient
for each covariate is insignificant for some period in time, which indicates
that during this period it temporarily has no effect on the hazard. Decision-
making speed is, in that period, affected only by other covariates.
We now compare our new findings with Golub’s original claims for each
covariate.
QMV before the Single European Act (SEA)
Original claims: the hazard rate for proposals formally subject to QMV, as opposed
to unanimity, was 146% higher after six months and 82% higher after one year,
and the effect of QMV wore off after four years.
Our results confirm the first two claims, since the combined coefficient for
QMV is positive and highly significant for t = 180 and t = 360 and neither
of the respective confidence intervals around the hazard ratios contains one.2
The combined coefficient is negative and statistically significant until t = 882,
so for the 1968–87 period the positive effects of QMV on speed wore off after
29 months (when t = 882), not four years. Moreover, the impact of QMV
reverses sign and once again becomes significant for very long decision-
making processes (more than 10 years). Apart from only five exceptional cases
that survived well over two standard deviations beyond the mean, this goes
beyond the period for which we have observations and thus could easily be
an artifact of our analysis. For this reason, we will disregard this effect.
QMV after the Single European Act
Original claims: the effect of QMV in the period after the SEA was the same as in
the pre-SEA period, and for the first five months the pre-SEA effect was actually
larger than the post-SEA effect.
Our results confirm the first but not the second claim. Judging only from the
combined coefficient, as Golub (2007: 168) did, the coefficients presented in
Golub and Steunenberg How Time Affects EU Decision-Making 5 5 9
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Table 2 seem to indicate that the speeding-up effect of QMV before the SEA
was greater than the effect of QMV after 1987 for at least the first 80 days.
Soon after this short period the relative impact of these coefficients seems to
reverse. But taking the respective standard errors into account reveals that
the effects of QMV pre- and post-SEA are indistinguishable for all values of
time. Figure 1 plots the respective hazard ratios and confidence intervals for
QMV in the two periods, and shows that they always overlap.
Cooperation 1987–93
Original claim: for the period 1987–93 the negative effect of the cooperation
procedure on decision-making speed outweighed the positive effect of QMV after
SEA during the first year of a proposal’s survival time.
Our results paint a more complicated, and in one respect slightly less severe,
picture of the trade-off between speed and Parliamentary involvement. The
hazard ratio for QMV after the SEA and the cooperation procedure is signifi-
cantly less than 1 until t = 249, then indistinguishable from 1 until t = 497,
then significantly greater than 1 thereafter. So in the six years following the
SEA, the drag from cooperation overwhelms QMV for first 8 months (not 12),
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Figure 1 Effect of QMV before and after the Single European Act.
Note: The thick lines plot the relative hazard for QMV before and after the Single European Act.
The thin lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
then neutralizes it for the next 8 months, but the QMV effect outweighs the
cooperation effect after 16 months. We can also report two new findings: the
drag from cooperation wears off only after 688 days, and, more surprisingly,
after 1218 days the effect of cooperation is reversed and significantly speeds
decision-making. This might be a statistical artifact, though, since, although
there are 67 cases in the data set that were proposed under cooperation and
survived more than 1218 days, all but three of them shifted to codecision at
some point. The relevant issue, then, is the effect of codecision on EU decision-
making speed, which we discuss below.
QMV after the Treaty on European Union (TEU)
Original claims: ever since the Maastricht Treaty, QMV exerted a still significant
but somewhat reduced effect, there was no evidence of a unanimity norm, 
and for the first 18 months the effect of QMV was larger during 1968–87 than
during 1994–9.
Our results confirm a significant but temporarily reduced effect of QMV
compared with previous periods, show that the unanimity norm is even
weaker than originally claimed, and provide a more optimistic prediction
about the impact of prospective reforms to extend the scope of QMV. The
effect of QMV after the Maastricht treaty (post-TEU) is not time dependent,
so does not appear in Table 2. For all values of t, the hazard ratio is 1.51, with
a confidence interval from 1.09 to 2.09. Thus for the entire 1994–9 period QMV
was consistently faster than unanimity, so there is no sign of a unanimity
norm. To compare the effects of QMV in the post-Maastricht period with its
effects in earlier periods we then examined the three respective confidence
intervals. These comparisons reveal that, for the first 4 months, the effect of
QMV was greater during the period before Maastricht than after Maastricht,
and that for only the first 5 months (not 18) the effect of QMV was greater
during the period 1968–87 than during the period 1994–9. After 5 months all
three confidence intervals overlap. In other words, the full effects of QMV
return much more quickly than originally reported. So the unanimity norm
is even weaker than Golub thought, and prospective QMV reforms would
likely ease inertia more than he originally suggested.
Codecision and cooperation after Maastricht
Original claim: the drag exerted by each of these procedures outweighs the effects
of QMV for 18 months.
Again our results confirm a slightly more complicated trade-off between
speed and democratic inclusiveness. The hazard ratio for proposals subject
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to QMV and codecision is significantly less than 1 until t = 343, then in-
distinguishable from 1 for the period between 344 and 866 days, then signifi-
cantly more than 1 for t > 866. Thus, during the period 1994–9, the drag from
codecision outweighed the effects of QMV for 11 months (not 18). The two
effects balance out for the next 17 months, and QMV more than offsets the
delays from codecision only after 28 months.
We can also report two important new findings. First, inspection of their
respective confidence intervals shows that the effects of cooperation and co-
decision are indistinguishable for all values of t, so the European Parliament’s
growth from agenda-setter to veto player has not slowed EU decision-making.
Second, the effect of codecision wears off after 671 days, then after t = 1674
it is reversed and significantly speeds up decisions. Overall, our results
suggest that broadening participation in the legislative process by empower-
ing the European Parliament adds nearly two extra years to a decision, but
helps resolve disagreement on the especially contentious proposals that
experience more than four-and-a-half years of negotiations. This result is
hardly what proponents of deliberative democracy and informal norms have
in mind when they claim that adding more voices to the discussion expedites
the EU legislative process.
Thatcher effect
Original claims: when Thatcher was prime minister the hazard was 22% lower
after 6 months, and the ‘Thatcher effect’ wore off after 14 months.
Results in Table 2 show that the negative ‘Thatcher effect’ was slightly less
than this, and, more interestingly, that it eventually reverses direction and
significantly speeds the adoption of legislation. The combined coefficient for
Thatcher is negative and significant until t = 246, indistinguishable from 0
for t = 247 through 793, then positive and significant for t > 794. Thus the
hazard rate when Thatcher was prime minister was 22% lower after 6 months,
as Golub originally claimed (with a confidence interval from 7% to 35%), but
it wore off after 8 months (not 14), and its effect reversed after 26 months.
This curious finding deserves further study, but one possible explanation
is that the reversal reflects a landmark change in Thatcher’s attitude towards
the EU. Thatcher became prime minister in 1979 and was highly antagon-
istic for nearly five years until, following an agreement at the June 1984
European Council summit at Fontainebleau, ‘the British budgetary dispute
was over’ (Dinan, 1999: 92) and she ‘got her money back’. It is certainly
possible then that pre-Fontainebleau proposals were bogged down by
Thatcher for much longer than 8 months, which drags down the hazard ratio,
and were the ones more likely to survive 26 months and experience Thatcher’s
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new views. So we would expect no Thatcher effect on proposals that were
made after June 1984, and for those made earlier the effect should vanish if
they survived past this date. This would account for the figures in Table 2,
and a four-year period of intransigence would also accord well with Golub’s
other findings that do not derive from survival analysis – that Eurosclerosis
appeared only upon Thatcher’s arrival with a decline in Council output; that
proposals made in 1979 and 1980 survived an unusually long time compared
with those in the years immediately preceding and following; and that the
volume of Council adoptions rose sharply in 1984 (Golub, 1999).
In future work, the most effective way to investigate this matter would
be to construct a TVC that codes state changes for proposals under consider-
ation before or after the Fontainebleau summit, or, better still, that reflects
shifts in Thatcher’s attitude. The latter could be folded into the broader TVC
Golub’s article suggests to capture shifts in Council heterogeneity.
Backlog
Original claim: mounting backlog expedited Council decision-making on new
proposals.
A proper interpretation of time-interaction effects yields more precise and
interesting results. Table 2 shows that the combined coefficient for legislative
backlog (with backlog set to its average value of 169) is positive and signifi-
cant until t = 295, then indistinguishable from zero for t = 296 through 1421,
then significant and negative for t > 1421. So, an average-sized backlog
expedites decisions, in line with Golub’s original claim, but only for the first
10 months. It has no discernible effect for the next three years, and then slows
decision-making for proposals that have survived over 46 months. This
reversal of sign shows that a large backlog spurs the Council to dispose of
new proposals but does not expedite passage of the most controversial pieces
of legislation.
Conclusions
Survival analysis often requires the use of models that contain time-
interaction terms to deal with the non-proportional effects of certain co-
variates, but it is easy to misinterpret the results of such models. We have
shown that the key to correct interpretation is calculating the magnitude,
standard error and statistical significance of the term formed by combining a
covariate’s time-dependent and time-independent coefficients. In his recent
study of decision-making speed in the European Union published in this
European Union Politics 8(4)5 6 4
journal, Golub (2007) overlooked this issue, and by addressing it we obtained
more precise findings.
From our re-analysis of his data we draw three main conclusions. First,
the effect that formal QMV rules have on speeding up decision-making is
even larger and more consistent than originally claimed. Not only did QMV
have a substantial effect as far back as the 1960s, this effect did not increase
following the Single European Act. Following the Maastricht Treaty, speed
under QMV was consistently faster than under unanimity, and the full effects
of QMV returned much more quickly than Golub first thought. There is little
sign, as often purported, that the EU legislative process operates by a
unanimous consensus norm that slows down decision-making. Second, the
trade-off between decision-making efficiency and legitimacy is more com-
plicated than Golub recognized. The growth of the European Parliament’s
powers beyond mere consultation did significantly slow decision-making, but
its evolution from an agenda-setter to a veto player added no discernible extra
delay. Third, the effects of some key variables do not just wear off but actually
reverse direction once proposals survive long periods of time. We suspect that
some of these reversals are statistical artifacts, or, as in the case of the
‘Thatcher effect’, will vanish once we develop a more sophisticated TVC to
capture shifts in Council heterogeneity. We attribute others, such as those for
legislative backlog and codecision, with more substantive meaning.
Notes
1 The only example we know of where analysts have done this is Box-
Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001: 984), and we are grateful to them for sharing
their elegant Stata routine, which makes the calculations of standard errors
and confidence intervals less cumbersome.
2 At t = 180 the hazard ratio is 2.46 with a 95% confidence interval from 2.00
to 3.03. At t = 360 the hazard ratio is 1.83 with a 95% confidence interval
from 1.53 to 2.17.
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